We propose a quantum voting system in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. Our scheme violates a quantum analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which states that every (classical) constitution endowed with three innocuous-seeming properties is a dictatorship. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement of votes feature in voting tactics available to quantum voters but not to classical.
Voting schemes used today are classical: Each voter submits one preference, and preferences combine deterministically into society's preference. What if citizens could superpose, interfere, and entangle votes? The quantization of voting schemes offers an opportunity to explore the power of quantum information theory. This investigation furthers the tradition of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma [1] , in which players superpose classical strategies and share entanglement [2] .
We propose a quantum voting system that violates a quantum analog of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [3] and that accommodates entanglement and superpositions. According to Arrow's Theorem, every (classical) dictatorship that has three innocuousseeming properties-that respects transitivity, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives-is a dictatorship. Arrow's Theorem is surprisingly deep and has spawned interpretations of its mathematical formulation and of its implications about fair elections [4] . The theorem has fundamentally impacted game theory and voting theory. Yet Arrow's Theorem derives from classical logic, and a quantum extension turns out to be false.
Our approach differs from earlier quantum and classical work as follows. Quantum voting theory has focused on privacy and cryptography [5] [6] [7] , whereas we draw inspiration from game theory. Classical voting is known to violate Arrow's Theorem if voters' opinions are restricted to single-peaked preferences [8] . Rather than introduce an assumption into classical elections, we recast Arrow's scheme in quantum mechanical terms. Another classical violation attempt involves probabilistic mixtures of votes. This attempt, however, violates one of Arrow's postulates [9] .
The paper is organized as follows. We first define quantum votes, constitutions, and constitutional properties. After introducing and disproving a quantum analog of Arrow's Theorem, we explore entanglement-and superposition-dependent voting tactics.
I. SOCIETIES, VOTERS, AND QUANTUM PREFERENCES
Let S denote a society that consists of N voters. Voter i = 1, 2, . . . , N is associated with a finite Hilbert space H i . By L(H), we denote the space of linear positive semidefinite operators defined on the Hilbert space H. Society is associated with a joint state σ soc ∈ P(H 1 ) × . . . × P(H N ) that represents the votes.
Voter i has a quantum preference ρ i that results from tracing out every subsystem except the i th from society's joint state: ρ i := Tr (σ soc ), wherein Tr denotes a trace over all voters except i. We will sometimes denote a pure quantum preference by |ψ i . The set of all voters' quantum preferences forms society's quantum profile P := {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ N }, just as the set of all voters' classical preferences forms a profile in a classical election.
Let a, b, . . . , m denote the M candidates ranked by voters. Society must form a transitive ordered list, which we term a classical preference, of the candidates. In each classical preference, each candidate is ranked above, ranked below, or tied with each other candidate: a > b, a < b, or a = b. With each classical preference, we associate one pure state in each of 
Projectively measuring a quantum preference with B H yields a classical preference. If ρ i is a nontrivial linear combination or mixture of B i elements, the measurement is nondeterministic. A voter's ability to superpose classical preferences resembles a prisoner's ability to superpose classical tactics in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma [1] .
Elections proceed as follows: Every voter sends a quantum preference to an election committee. The ρ i 's enter a quantum circuit that implements a constitution (defined in Sec. II). The circuit's output is measured with B soc , yielding society's classical preference.
II. QUANTUM CONSTITUTIONS
A classical constitution is a map from a classical profile to a classical preference. We will define quantum constitutions, then review properties of classical constitutions and introduce quantum analogs. Our quantization scheme is justified in Appendix A.
Definition 1 (Quantum constitution).
A quantum constitution is a convex-linear completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map
that transforms society's joint state σ soc into society's quantum preference ρ soc :
wherein |0 0| denotes a fiducial state to which society's quantum preference is initialized.
A. Four properties in Arrow's Theorem
A classical constitution can have properties such as transitivity, respecting of unanimity, respecting of independence of irrelevant alternatives, being a dictatorship, and respecting of majority rule. The first four properties feature in Arrow's Theorem. Let us review these properties and define quantum analogs.
A classical constitution is transitive if every classical preference in its range is transitive. A classical preference is transitive if a ≥ b and b ≥ c, together, imply a ≥ c.
Definition 2 (Quantum transitivity).
A quantum constitution E respects quantum transitivity if every possible output ρ soc , upon being measured in the preference basis B soc , collapses to a state |a . . . m associated with a transitive classical preference (a . . . m). 1 We will sometimes condense the subscript to G 
Every E obeys quantum transitivity by definition: Given any input, E outputs a ρ soc that is a linear combination or a mixture of preference-basis elements. A B soc measurement of ρ soc yields a B soc element, which corresponds to a transitive classical preference. A classical constitution that respects unanimity ranks a > b if every voter ranks a > b. 
Definition 3 (Quantum unanimity
)
Definition 5 (Quantum dictatorship).
A quantum constitution is a quantum dictatorship if there exists a voter i who has the following two characteristics: (i) If Voter i's quantum preference has support on the a > b subspace, so does society's:
(ii) If Voter i's quantum preference lacks support on the a > b subspace, so does society's:
B. Majority rule
We will disprove a quantum analog of Arrow's Theorem with a quantum analog of majority rule. The majority-rule classical constitution ranks a relative to b as most voters do. A subtlety arises if society's profile P is cyclic. A set T = {a, b, . . . , k} of candidates forms a cycle if every c ∈ T participates in pairwise preferences (e.g., b > c, c > d) that appear in P and that violate transitivity. Every c ∈ T , furthermore, participates in such a transitivity-violating pair with each other d ∈ T .
For example, consider
A naïve application of majority rule implies a > b and b > c, whereupon transitivity implies a > c. But a naïve application of majority rule implies also c > a, so society's classical preference must respect c > a, which violates transitivity. The constitution may be defined as outputting a = b = c or an error message. Because of cycles, classical majority rule fails to satisfy IIA and transitivity simultaneously.
A quantum extension of majority rule can have both properties. Before defining the extension, we introduce quantum cycles. Let σ soc = χ α 1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ χ µ N denote a product of preference-basis elements. Suppose that at least two χ γ i 's correspond to classical preferences that form a classical cycle. We will say that σ soc contains a cycle.
The Quantum Majority-Rule (QMR) constitution E sends each ρ i through the phasedamping channel Φ:
QMR then processes the ρ i 's as would the constitution E , defined as follows. By linearity,
From χ
E inputs the graph into Tarjan's algorithm for finding the graph's strongly connected components [10] . A strongly connected component (SCC) is a subgraph in which every node can be accessed from each other node via edges. Every vertex appears in exactly one SCC. Every SCC in the QMR graph represents a cycle or a set of interlinked cycles. For example, suppose E acts on |bacd |acbd , whose > signs we have dropped to condense notation. Tarjan's algorithm returns a list of the SCCs. Every vertex in the j th SCC is preferred to every vertex in the i th , if i < j. For example, Tarjan's algorithm maps Fig. 1  to ({d}, {a, b, c}) . E forms a maximally mixed state over the classical preferences formable from the candidates in each SCC. Combining the mixtures, E orders the SCCs according to preference (reverses the ordering outputted by Tarjan's algorithm):
C[|abcd abcd| + |cabd cabd| + |bcad bcad| + |cbad cbad| (7) + |bacd bacd| + |acbd acbd| + (terms that contain = signs)], wherein C denotes a normalization factor. Expression (7) contains terms associated with c > a and c = a, but every voter ranks a > c. To respect quantum unanimity, E projects Expression (7) onto the a > c subspace:
Formally, QMR is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Quantum Majority Rule). The Quantum Majority-Rule constitution E maps σ soc to the same ρ soc as the following algorithm:
1. Calculate ρ i for all i.
Evaluate
, wherein the quantum constitution E acts as follows.
(a) Form a digraph in which each node corresponds to one candidate and vice versa. To learn society's classical preference r soc , one measures the constitution's output with B soc . Due to this decohering measurement and to the dephasing channel Φ, r soc can be obtained by a random choice from among classical preferences, rather than from a quantum circuit. But QMR is not equivalent to the classical majority-rule constitution F. Suppose that F, given a cycle over at least three candidates, chose society's preference randomly. F would violate transitivity. QMR constitutions respect quantum transitivity by definition. (As proved in Appendix B, QMR respects also quantum unanimity and QIIA.) This discrepancy between classical and quantum majority rule enables QMR to violate a quantum analog of Arrow's Theorem.
III. ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that every classical constitution endowed with three innocent-seeming properties is a dictatorship [3, 11] .
Theorem 1 (Arrow's Impossibility Theorem). Every classical constitution that respects transitivity, unanimity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives is a dictatorship.
We quantize Arrow's Theorem in the following conjecture, which we will disprove.
Conjecture 1 (Quantum Arrow Conjecture). Every quantum constitution that respects quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA is a quantum dictatorship. Proof. To simplify notation, we focus on strict preferences and drop binary-relation signs: |abc := |a > b > c . To prove the theorem by contradiction, we suppose that
The QMR constitution E constructs a digraph in which one edge points from a to b (because two voters prefer a > b, whereas one prefers b > a), one edge points from b to c, and one edge points from c to a (Fig. 2) . The digraph consists of one SCC, and no candidate is preferred unanimously to any other. Hence ρ soc = C[|abc abc| + |cab cab| + |bca bca| + |cba cba| + |bac bac| + |acb acb| + (terms that contain = signs)],
wherein C normalizes the state. ρ soc has a larger support than each of the votes. By Definition 5, no voter is a dictator. Yet E respects quantum transitivity, quantum unanimity, and QIIA, by Lemma 1 in Appendix B. Hence E violates the Quantum Arrow Conjecture. One can understand as follows why our voting system violates the Arrow conjecture. First, consider the motivations for quantizing elections as in Sections I and II. Given the successes of quantum game theory, an election that accommodates superposed and entangled preferences merits construction. To introduce superpositions and entanglement, one must define a quantum election in terms of a general quantum process: a preparation procedure, an evolution, and a measurement [12] . One must translate the definitions of "dictatorship," "transitivity," etc. as faithfully as possible into properties of quantum systems. These quantum definitions combine with QMR and a cyclic profile into a violation of the Arrow conjecture.
Simpler disproofs exist, though the disproof above offers interpretational advantages. For instance, a quantum constitution K that outputs a superposition over all inputs violates the conjecture. But imposing K on society-choosing society's classical preference randomlymakes little economic sense. Also, disproving the conjecture with a quantum analog of classical majority rule, which does not violate Arrow's Theorem, demonstrates how quantum mechanics invalidates the theorem.
IV. QUANTUM VOTING TACTICS
How one should vote, to secure the most desirable election outcome possible, is not always clear. Strategic voting is the submission of a preference other than one's opinion in an election amongst at least three candidates, to secure an unobjectionable outcome.
For example, imagine that Alice, Bob, and Charlie vie for the presidency of the American Physical Society. Suppose that Alice and Bob have greater chances of winning than Charlie, and that Charlie agrees more with Alice than with Bob. Charlie's supporters might strategically vote for Alice, to elect a president whom they neither prefer most nor mind.
Quantum strategic voting and other quantum voting tactics rely on superpositions, interference, and entanglement. For simplicity, we assume that σ soc is pure and focus on strict preferences a > b. We will denote the classical preference a > b > . . . > m and its even permutations by α, . . . , µ, as in Sec. I. Each anticycle m > . . . > b > a will be denoted by a bar:ᾱ. Pure quantum preferences have the form
Society's joint quantum state has the form
A. Quantum strategic voting via interference
Relative phases and interference facilitate quantum strategic voting. Consider a society S whose voters submit pure states and that uses the following variation, dubbed QMR2, on QMR. 4 As an example, suppose that
such that |σ soc = 1 2 (|abc |bac |bac + |abc |bac |cba + |abc |acb |bac + |abc |acb |cba ).
Like the E in the QMR definition, the QMR2 constitution E 2 forms a digraph from each |σ soc term. Each graph is inputted into Tarjan's algorithm, which returns a list of the SCCs. Just as E maps each list to a mixed state ξ, E 2 maps the i th list to a superposition |ξ i . In the example,
If Ξ|Ξ = 0, E 2 normalizes |Ξ :
, and ρ soc = |ρ soc ρ soc |. If Ξ|Ξ = 0 (no quantum system emerges from the constitution circuit), society can hold a revote.
Suppose that Voter 3 wishes to eliminate bac from society's possible classical preferences. Eliminating |bac from |ψ 3 will not suffice. Voter 3 can introduce a relative phase of −1, such that society's quantum profile becomes
Tarjan's algorithm leads to |Ξ = (|abc − |acb ). Though keeping the undesired |bac in |ψ 3 contradicts our intuitions, interfering this superposition with the other votes eliminates bac from society's possible classical preferences. 4 Because QMR2 is defined on just pure states and does not preserve all inputs' norms, QMR2 does not satisfy Definition 1. QMR2 can be thought of as an extension of quantum constitutions. 5 Alternatively, Voter 3 could submit a superposition of |abc and |acb .
B. Three entanglement-dependent voting tactics
As the QMR algorithm eliminates entanglement, we define the entanglement-preserving variation QMR3. First, every ρ i is measured in the preference basis. The outcomes form a list L of classical preferences. If most of the preferences are identical-say, if most equal γ-γ becomes society's classical preference. If no majority favors any γ, the constitution randomly chooses from amongst the classical preferences that appear with the highest frequency in L.
Entanglement (|ααα + |ᾱᾱᾱ ). Finally, entangling voters' quantum preferences can pare down society's possible classical preferences. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie separately favor α twice as much as they prefer β. Each voter plans to submit 
If the constitution is QMR3, society might adopt α or β as its classical preference. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie misunderstand entanglement. Eve can take advantage of their ignorance to eliminate β from society's possible classical preferences. Suppose that Eve convinces the three citizens to submit |σ soc ent = 1 √ 3 (|βαα + |αβα + |ααβ ).
This entangled analog of |σ soc prod , Eve might claim, represents the voters' opinion by containing twice as many α's as β's. But QMR3 cannot map |σ soc ent to β. Entangled states lead to different possible election outcomes than product states. Equation (20) (|βαα + |αβα + |ααβ ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantized elections in the tradition of quantum game theory. The quantization obviates a quantum analog of Arrow's Theorem about the impossibility of a nondictatorship's having three common properties. Superpositions, interference, and entanglement expand voters' arsenals of manipulation tactics. Whether other quantum tactics unavailable to ordinary voters exist merits investigation. So does whether monogamy of entanglement [13] limits one voter's influence on others' quantum preferences. If creating entanglement is difficult (as in many labs), the resource theory of multipartite entanglement [14] might illuminate how voters can optimize their influence. Other voting schemes could be quantized, such as proportional representation (in which the percentage of voters who favor Party a dictates the number of government seats Party a wins) and cardinal voting (in which voters grade candidates).
